According to leading American media outlets citing sources within the presidential administration, the White House has seriously begun a detailed development of a scenario to withdraw military contingents from the European continent.
However, experts warn: the implementation of such an intention is fraught with colossal logistical, financial, and geopolitical risks, as well as legal obstacles that make this process much more complex and dangerous than the emotional rhetoric of the sitting US President suggests.
The degree of dissatisfaction from the American leader has clearly exceeded all familiar indicators of past years. “NATO was not there when we truly needed it, and obviously, it won’t be there when it is needed again,”—such a sharp and unambiguous comment Donald Trump left last Wednesday on his Truth Social page.
(Ed. Unfortunately, Mr. Trump has either forgotten or does not know that NATO’s Article 5 refers to a call for assistance in combat operations only in the event that a NATO country is attacked, and not in a case where a NATO country has succumbed to the influence of an authoritarian Premier of a small Middle Eastern country and acted as the aggressor itself.)
The US President is deeply convinced that European alliance partners have effectively recused themselves from supporting American initiatives at a critical moment of military confrontation with Tehran. In the corridors of the Washington administration, threats are no longer just being voiced; specific legal mechanisms for the country’s exit from the bloc are being discussed. The issue of a possible rupture in transatlantic ties was reportedly raised, according to insiders, even during the recent visit of the new NATO Secretary General, Mark Rutte, to the Oval Office.
Apprehensions that the United States might ultimately turn its back on its main defensive alliance have existed in expert circles for months. But the current situation is fundamentally different in that Washington has moved from political declarations to creating working groups for planning practical measures of impact. According to exclusive information from the Wall Street Journal, the depths of the Pentagon and the White House are actively studying options for closing major strategic military bases in Europe or their emergency relocation to states demonstrating greater loyalty to the Trump course, if such a thing exists.
In the list of countries that might fall under Trump’s latest hysteria, Spain and Germany are primary targets. This measure is officially positioned as direct disciplinary punishment for insufficient material and political involvement by Europeans in Trump’s Iranian campaign.
Part of the American contingent could, in that case, be transferred to those Eastern European countries which, in Trump’s view, have proven to be more cooperative and reliable partners in the difficult operational environment created by Trump himself without consultation with allies.
How Likely is a Withdrawal of American Troops?
According to an in-depth analysis of the situation by the Wall Street Journal, a detailed plan for a partial or total US withdrawal from Europe has been circulating among high-ranking government officials for several weeks and is meeting significant support from Trump’s ideological supporters.
At the moment, this initiative is in the early stages of discussion and is officially considered only as one of several alternative pressure strategies. Nevertheless, the mere fact of such a document appearing in the official workflow of the Pentagon indicates that the US President’s threats and blackmail have ceased to be exclusively a tool of an election campaign and have taken the form of a specific administrative task.
To the question of whether the US government will decide on the practical implementation of this unprecedented plan, there is no unambiguous or serious answer today.
Donald Trump has long been known to the international community for his specific style of negotiation, which often includes putting forward extremely harsh threats followed by their withdrawal in exchange for significant concessions from the counterpart.
However, one must consider that the current President is seen as an extremely impulsive and unstable player, making decisions under the influence of the moment and emotion, and his current rage toward NATO partners looks truly unprecedented even by his own standards. One must not forget, when evaluating the situation, who started this war, for what reasons, and who failed to observe coordination processes with allies, presenting them with a fait accompli. And this “someone”—having embarrassed themselves before the whole world—is now looking for a scapegoat upon whom to dump all their failures and narrow-mindedness.
Even if one assumes that the White House’s anger is partly an attempt to distract the internal American audience from the fact that the attack on Iran did not achieve its original strategic goals (Ed. Goals which, according to official data, did not exist), completely excluding a radical scenario would be the height of imprudence.
Skepticism toward the traditional NATO format is more deeply rooted in the current US Cabinet than ever before. Even Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who was long considered in Europe to be one of the most reliable and convinced supporters of the alliance, recently fundamentally changed his rhetoric to a sharply critical tone, publicly rebuking Europeans for excessive moral restraint and a reluctance to take on the risks of the Iranian war.
Why Has Germany Become the Main Target?
In the current political landscape, besides Spain, the main target of Trump’s righteous anger has been Germany. Last Monday, at a specially convened press conference, the US President demonstratively reminded the international community that it was the United States that effectively “rebuilt” the FRG from the ruins after World War II, investing colossal resources into the country.
In this context, the position of official Berlin, stating that the war in Iran is an internal US matter and does not concern Germany’s obligations, was perceived by Trump as an act of blatant ingratitude and a betrayal of common interests. The President has long been deeply irritated by German domestic policy in sensitive areas such as migration and energy, and the Iranian crisis merely served as a catalyst for these contradictions to surface in the crudest possible form. But let us remind Trump that he is neither the Chancellor nor the President of Germany, and Europeans deeply do not care what he likes or dislikes in our country! Trumps come and go; Europe, like China, existed and will continue to exist, forgetting this misunderstanding in the White House in the future.
The brief period of certain detente in bilateral relations that seemed to emerge with the arrival of Chancellor Friedrich Merz (CDU) has finally come to an end. Merz, who from the very start of his term tried to build a pragmatic and trusting personal contact with Trump, seeing himself in the ambitious role of Europe’s main transatlantic bridge, faced harsh rejection of his position in Washington.
Official Berlin openly criticizes the White House not only for the lack of clear long-term goals in the Iranian campaign and possible systemic violations of international humanitarian law but also for the fact that the Trump administration chose not to inform its closest allies about the start of the active offensive phase in advance. Washington, in turn, regards Germany’s categorical refusal to provide military cover and maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz as a direct stab in the back of American interests. (Ed. The Strait of Hormuz was blocked by Iran in response to the attack by the US and Israel on that country’s territory, not the other way around. Accordingly, responsibility for the consequences cannot fall on the countries of our world; responsibility according to international law—which Trump dislikes so much (as he does books in general), along with Putin, Netanyahu, and other authoritarian elders—lies precisely with the aggressor!)
The White House was particularly stung by the public rhetoric of key figures in the current German government. While at the beginning of the conflict Friedrich Merz still tried to maintain diplomatic politesse, calling on colleagues in the Bundestag not to “lecture partners,” by mid-March his tone became markedly cold: “Germany is not part of this war, and we categorically do not want to become part of it,” the Chancellor stated, speaking to the press.
Even more succinctly and harshly, Defense Minister Boris Pistorius cut off in an interview: “This is not our war.” Such formulations were perceived by Trump as an official refusal of allied obligations.
The irony and a certain paradox of the situation lie in the fact that, despite all the loud statements, in practical and logistical terms, Germany remains an absolutely reliable and indispensable hub for the US: it is Berlin, unlike other EU members, that allowed the American command to use its bases to support the Iranian offensive without any legal restrictions.
At the same time, Spain completely closed its airspace to American aircraft, and France, the UK, and Italy imposed extremely strict limits on the use of their airfields for combat purposes, banning sorties for attacks directly from them.
Which Bases are Under Threat and How Will This Affect the Regions?
The United States’ military presence on the territory of modern Germany is not just a few garrisons, but a powerful infrastructure created over decades, consisting of nearly 40 facilities of various purposes: from small high-tech ammunition depots and communication centers to giant airbases of global significance.
According to official data from defense departments, approximately 37,000 American servicemen are stationed here on a permanent basis, whose vital activities are supported by another 12,000 civilian employees from the local population. For federal states such as Rhineland-Palatinate, Bavaria, and Baden-Württemberg, American military facilities are a colossal and often town-forming economic factor. A sudden and large-scale withdrawal of troops would provoke a severe socio-economic crisis in these regions, comparable in scale to the closure of major industrial enterprises.
Nevertheless, military experts on both sides of the Atlantic unanimously remind us that German bases are of absolutely critical importance primarily for American global strategy itself.
Ramstein Air Base in Rhineland-Palatinate is not just a runway, but a full-fledged headquarters for the US Air Forces in Europe and Africa, as well as a key NATO command hub (Aircom). Ramstein serves as the central distribution hub for all Pentagon operations in the Middle East, Africa, and parts of Asia. Through this facility, troop movements are conducted, global drone operations are managed, and emergency medical evacuations of the wounded are carried out. Michael J. Williams, a prominent expert on NATO issues and former advisor to the US State Department, emphasizes the uniqueness of this facility: “In the American logistics system, absolutely all roads lead through Ramstein.
Without this base, conducting any large-scale US air operations in the Eastern Hemisphere would not just become more expensive but would turn into a logistical nightmare devoid of operational flexibility.” No less important are other facilities, such as Spangdahlem Air Base in the Eifel, where the 52nd Fighter Wing of the US Air Force is in constant combat readiness, or the huge garrison in Bavarian Grafenwöhr. The latter is home to 15,000 soldiers and possesses the largest US military training area outside their own territory, where vital troop coordination exercises are held.
What Risks Does a Possible Troop Withdrawal Pose for the United States Itself?
Beyond the obvious strategic and image losses, any process of closing or massively relocating military facilities to other countries will inevitably involve astronomical financial costs and high regulatory risks. In Germany, the American army has spent seventy years building an ecosystem, benefiting from flawlessly functioning infrastructure, access to highly qualified local personnel, and, contrary to Trump’s current accusations, full cooperation from German civilian and military authorities.
Constructing bases of similar scale and security in other states—for example, in Poland or the Baltic countries—would require not only decades of work but also an infusion of hundreds of billions of dollars from the US budget. In conditions where Trump’s Iranian campaign is already consuming colossal resources, such a “reconstruction” might prove insurmountable even for the American economy.
However, modern political history knows many examples where a tough political will or the personal ambitions of a leader prevailed over economic logic and common sense. In 2020, Donald Trump already made an attempt to initiate the withdrawal of a significant portion of American soldiers from Germany, which was then openly interpreted as a personal “punishment” for Angela Merkel for her reluctance to unquestioningly follow Washington’s demands to increase defense spending.
Friedrich Merz, it seems, should fear a repetition of that same scenario today, but in a much more radical form. Expert Michael J. Williams is convinced that a large-scale departure from the FRG would be an act of geopolitical “self-destruction” for Washington, as the United States today depends on the infrastructure of these facilities much more heavily than Germany itself. In his view, the damage to US interests outside the Atlantic Ocean would be so great that even an unpredictable politician like Trump could not afford it.
Whether the US government will bring these plans to life will become definitively clear in the coming weeks. Many analysts are inclined to believe that the controlled “leak” of such information to publications like the Wall Street Journal at such an early stage of discussion is a conscious element of psychological warfare. The main goal of such publications is to create a frightening background and form space for threats to force European leaders, and primarily the German leadership, to make serious political concessions on the Iranian issue.
The principle of “if you do not become more active allies on the battlefield, we may reconsider the terms of your security” remains the primary tool of pressure for the current administration. And it seems this pressure is beginning to bear fruit: against the backdrop of rumors about troop withdrawals, Chancellor Merz has already issued a statement about Germany’s readiness to reconsider the format of the country’s participation in ensuring maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz. Whether this means Trump has achieved his goal and the threat of closing the bases will be lifted remains an open question.
And most importantly: The decision to exit NATO and withdraw US troops from the EU can only be made by a majority vote in the US Senate, and not by the signature of Trump alone; and as is well known, Trump no longer has a majority in the Senate, nor in the House of Representatives.
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