Сара Вагенкнехт
Сара Вагенкнехт © Фото: ChatGPT

Mention of Russian Administrator Found on Sahra Wagenknecht’s Facebook Profile

Sahra Wagenknecht regularly draws attention with statements that could seemingly originate directly from the Russian government apparatus. Now, a "Russian trail" on her Facebook profile has provided fresh grounds for discussion.

Initially, Sahra Wagenknecht’s team dismissed the report as a mere tall tale. The response to an inquiry from t-online on Tuesday was one of significant bewilderment: what explanation could there be for the BSW party politician’s page being co-managed by an account that Facebook links to Russia? Two days later, the politician’s account was “cleaned up,” and the connection to Russia vanished. This link had already caused a public stir once before.

Sensitive information had been circulating on social media since Tuesday, gaining momentum after the satirical portal Der Postillon shared it with its large audience. This data became available only because Facebook is mandated to provide transparency details as a result of foreign disinformation campaigns. Users can now see details about accounts authorized to publish content and possessing access rights for every page. While names are not displayed, the number of accounts managing the page and their primary locations are listed.

For example, the page of Fabio De Masi, the current chairman of Wagenknecht’s party, is managed by only one person. Co-chair Amira Mohamed Ali has only two administrators, both residing in Germany. The situation for Sahra Wagenknecht and her husband, Oskar Lafontaine, looked entirely different: until Wednesday, 13 people had access to Wagenknecht’s page, and five to Lafontaine’s. According to Facebook’s data, one of these individuals had Russia listed as their primary location.

Facebook’s location data is based on various factors, with the location stated in a user’s profile playing only a secondary role. Although there is no official documentation on exactly how administrator locations are determined, the company admitted in 2019 that it could collect approximate location data even if users disabled tracking features. When data transmission is active, Meta determines physical locations with high precision. This allows for targeted local advertising while also enabling Meta to counter misinformation and hackers more effectively by flagging suspicious movements. Meta has not yet responded to an inquiry regarding the reliability of this specific data.

Three Administrators Removed After Inquiry

By Thursday, three administrators had disappeared from Wagenknecht’s page data, and one from Lafontaine’s. None of the remaining managers now showed a connection to Russia. Wagenknecht’s office initially explained that no staff members reside in Russia or hold a Russian passport. They suggested the inquiry was aimed at suspecting every Russian of being a Kremlin spy, reacting with irritation: “Where do you even get such ‘information’? What tall tales!”

After being informed that the information came from Facebook’s own transparency data, the office provided a substantive explanation: “A long-time employee of Ms. Wagenknecht, who is a German citizen, has relatives in Russia.” The woman reportedly visits family “from time to time.” They described Facebook’s “primary location” label as misleading, claiming it does not provide accurate information about an administrator’s permanent residence. A spokesperson has not yet responded to a follow-up inquiry from t-online regarding the removal of the administrators.

The fact that Wagenknecht employs someone with Russian roots has raised questions before. In 2022, the politician expressed dissatisfaction in a YouTube video (which then had 540,000 subscribers) regarding a post by her then-party colleague Bodo Ramelow that criticized Russia, which also hinted at a possible connection.

Video Publication Featured Cyrillic Script

When Wagenknecht discussed the issue at the time, the video included a screenshot of Ramelow’s post with a revealing detail: the German MP’s post showed the date in Cyrillic script. The display language on X (formerly Twitter) adapts to the language settings of the person viewing the post and taking the screenshot.

Regarding the Cyrillic screenshot, Wagenknecht responded then that her videos were “not illustrated by Putin’s agents.” She stated she employed a staff member of Russian origin “who has lived in Germany for many years and helps with editing and video illustrations.” According to current explanations, this same employee was the reason for the Russian administrator listing on Facebook. At the time, mocking posts circulated on X, such as: “Likely a work phone straight from the Kremlin.”

Even back then, Wagenknecht faced repeated accusations of being a mouthpiece for the Kremlin. Just days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Wagenknecht assured audiences that Moscow had no interest in an invasion. She emphasized that one should be glad Putin was not a “deranged nationalist who revels in the idea of moving borders.” Regarding civilian casualties in Ukraine, she claimed they were partly the result of falling debris from Ukrainian anti-aircraft missiles.

T-online also discovered that Wagenknecht’s long-time office manager, Ruth Firmenich, along with party colleague Michael von der Schulenburg, spoke with organizers of a Russian bribery network in Moscow in May 2025. These individuals were linked to the circle of Kremlin-loyal oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, who also operated the Voice of Europe resource. Money allegedly flowed through this group to European politicians. Consequently, an investigation is underway against AfD representative Petr Bystron, who has denied the allegations. MEP Firmenich told t-online that she met the interlocutors in Moscow for the first time and maintained no contact with them after the trip.

Facebook and X Blocked in Russia

In reality, Facebook and X are blocked for users in Russia. This forces local users to use VPN providers to mask their real IP addresses, making it appear as though they are accessing the internet from abroad. Recent transparency data from X showed that official Kremlin accounts, or the Russia-based German propagandist Alina Lipp, pretend to manage their accounts from Germany or France to bypass technical censorship in Russia. Simultaneously, transparency settings revealed that several large pro-Trump accounts appear to be located in Nigeria or are masquerading as such.


Source: t-online

author avatar
Daniel Tat